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Summary:
In June of 1911, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
announced priorities for those projects to be executed during the
next fiscal years. This study of these priorities adapts conditional
logit techniques for analysis of random orderings and estimates para-
meters of CPSC preference functions among projects. The CPSC is shown
to overselect projects with large safety benefits, but even larger con-
sumer costs, and projects which lead to mandatory standards.
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By authority of the five acts it administers, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) is empowered to reduce or eliminate consumer
exposure to unreasonable hazards from literally thousands of household
related products. Yet this vast task is to be accomplished with a
budgetary allotment from Congress which the Commission has on several
occasions stated to be inadequate for proper execution of its mandate.
In light of these considerations, it would seem vital for the CPSC to
organize the myriad of potential regulatory projects into a coherent
set of priorities. Yet not until FY1977 did the Commission publish
explicit priorities for those projects to be potentially executed. The
significance of these priorities is twofold. First, since several of
the projects considered for execution involved economic impacts on the
order' of hundreds of millions of dollars each year, CPSC priorities
represent an important resource allocation question in and of them-
selves. But secondly, it is the basic argxjment of this essay that CPSC
selection of priorities systematically revealed the underlying preferences
of the agency as regards the political and economic aspects of regula-
tion.
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I. The Development of CPSC Priorities
During the first years of its existence (1973-1976), the CPSC
selected regulatory activities in an informal process that was ill-
defined, and in retrospect, ill-advised. Potential projects were
identified on the basis of two sources of information: hospital
emergency-room data collected by the internal National Electronic
Injury Surveillance System (NEISS) and petitions submitted under sec-
tion 10 of the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA). Initially, the
Commissioners planned to use only the emergency-room data for tar-
geting useful regulatory actions. More specifically, the Commission
voted to process NEISS data into a Hazard Index (see Table One)
and to generate and execute first those projects which ranked highly
2
in this Index." In other words, a ranking of consumer products based
on the Hazard Index was to serve as the priority list for the Commis-
3
sion.
Use of this Hazard Index as a basis for priorities is subject to
several immediate and telling criticisms. While an extended discus-
4
sion of the Index can be found elsewhere, the most basic problems are
due to the use of association rather than causality as the basis for
inclusion of accidents (hence floors, tables, and chairs rank high on
the basis of the Index because they are frequently associated with
household injuries); due to the failure to correct for product usage
(hence truly dangerous products with limited sales will rank low in
terms of the Index); due to ommission of amenability of the hazard to
regulatory reduction as a factor in ranking (hence knives and matches
rank high on the Index); and due to the reliance on emergency room
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data which understates deaths and ignores property damage (hence fire
related accidents rank excessively low by the Index).
The fundamental difficulty with the Index is quite probably that
it does not embody a defensible definition of "unreasonable risk of
injury." Yet inasmuch as Congress has explicitly mandated the CPSC to
prevent unreasonable risks, such a definition would seem required. A
plausible approach to the identification of unreasonable risks would
appear to focus on those hazards which are not foreseen or are not
easily managed by most consumers, and which at the same time can be
readily prevented through collective action. In contrast, the CPSC
apparently originally regarded hazards as unreasonable simply because
they occurred with high frequency and severity. An unfortunate side
effect of this (mis-) definition of "unreasonable hazard" was that
very little room for economic considerations remained during early
selection of CPSC projects. Accordingly almost no benefit-cost esti-
mates for regulatory activities were generated before agency commit-
ment to projects. Instead, economic impact statements were prepared
after projects were well advanced, in a fashion and with consequences
similar to environmental impact statements. For these initial pro-
jects, it is thus virtually inconceivable that CPSC choices could
represent reasonable targeting of regulatory effort on economic
grounds. Even more egregiously, no estimates of agency resources uti-
lized for each project were prepared during these early years. Thus
even while the Commission publicly argued that it suffered a severe
budget constraint, no efforts were (or could be) made to efficiently
allocate agency resources among various projects, because the require-
ments of each project were unknown.
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The second origin of potential regulatory projects were petitions
to the CPSC by outside interests which formally requested specific
regulatory action against a specific consumer product hazard. During
calendar year 1973-1974, the Commission granted 9 of the 14 petitions
seeking mandatory standards or products bans; an additional three
petitions were granted in 1975. While an analysis and critique of
the petition process can be found elsewhere, early CPSC enthusiasm
for "public participation" in the regulatory process enabled outside
interests to substantially influence the agency's commitment of
resources to projects.
Under pressure from Congress (notably Senator Proxmire) , the Com-
mission began in late 1976 to develop a more explicit and defensible
set of procedures. The CPSC had initially devoted the bulk of regula-
tory effort to promulgation of mandatory safety standards for specific
products. Unfortunately, due to the fact that such standards
apparently require two to five years of development time, the Commis-
sion was notably short of definite accomplishments by 1976, the third
year of its effective existence. In light of this supposedly poor
track record, the CPSC found it increasingly necessary to justify its
distribution of expenditures and regulatory effort among potential
projects. Enter priorities.
The systematization and rationalization of project selection was
speeded when in May, 1976 Ford-appointee John Byington assumed office
as Chairman of the CPSC. Empowered by the 1976 Amendments to the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act to directly administer CPSC staff, Byington
devoted additional resources to the issue of Commission priorities and
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by July 1, the Commission announced in the Federal Register plans to
establish priorities for potential projects on the basis of the fol-
lowing criteria:
1) frequency of accident
2) severity of accident
3) amenability of accident to regulatory prevention
4) chronic nature of risk
5) benefit-cost ratio
6) unforeseen nature of risk
7) probability of exposure to risk
8) vulnerability of population to risk
9) agency resource usage.
Amenability was later dropped from the list of criteria on the grounds
that it was already implicitly included in the benefit-cost ratio.
(The fact that most all of the remaining criteria are also implicitly
included in the benefit-cost ratio does not seem to have occurred to
the Commission. More on this point later.)
The Commission directed the staff to collect the necessary data
and develop a preliminary ranking of projects. This direction led to
an almost nine month process of data accumulation and analysis. First,
projects to which the agency was partially committed were identified,
an effort which isolated over 180 projects for which some CPSC funding
was in 1976 being expended. The magnitude of this number was not
expected, particularly since the CPSC had resources to effectively
execute only 10-20 projects in a given year. Secondly, most all avail-
able statistics on the published criteria (except for staff resource
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demands, on which there was no data) for 35 key projects were gathered
into publications called Product Profiles and publicly released in
October, 1976. The goal of this data disclosure was to promote public
discussion and interaction for the priorities exercise. In November
of 1976, the staff narrowed the 180 potential projects down to 52 can-
didates for ranking. For these 52 projects (which included most of
the 35 treated in the Product Profiles ) additional data was collected
as necessary. In particular, estimates of total agency resources
needed for completion of each project were generated. Further, most
projects were rated on a high-medium-low basis as to fulfillment of
each of the published criteria. For example, projects with over
10,500 injuries a year were rated as high in frequency of accident, or
projects with mean severity of less than 17 (based on the exponentially
increasing severity scale discussed earlier) were rated low as regards
that criteria. For only 38 of the candidate projects was there suffi-
cient data to generate a full set of the appropriate ratings. In any
case, all available data on each of the 52 projects were gathered into
a volume labeled the Mid-Year Review (MYR) and published in March of
1977. Alongside this data, the MYR contained information on proce-
dural background for each project, as well as extensive discussions of
the comparative merits and defects of various projects. Between March
and May, the five Commissioners were repeatedly briefed on contents of
the MYR. Several projects were added as priority candidates by direc-
tion of the Commission. Then, by consensus decision, the Commissioners
divided all projects under consideration into those to be executed in
1977-1978 (high priority; 29 projects) , those to be executed in 1978-
1979 (medium priority; 17 projects) , and those whose execution would
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be delayed for the near future. There were fewer projects in the
medium than the high priority category due to the fact that most pro-
jects in the latter category would extend beyond the initial 1977-1978
period. Finally, on June 1, each Commissioner ranked in numerical
order all projects within both the high and medium categories. The
individual rankings by the five Commissioners were than aggregated by
Borda rule into rankings for the Commission as a whole. The resulting
priority list is given in Table Two.
This study is devoted to an examination of how various attributes
of the considered projects affected their relative rankings in the
final priority list. Among the considerations raised by this examina-
tion is the extent to which the CPSC acted in accordance with the
published procedures announced July 1, 1976 or rather to what extent
unannounced factors played an important role. The samples for the
study are as follows. For 38 projects, data can be tabulated for the
staff-developed high-medium-low ratings of the announced criteria, as
mentioned above, and these projects compose the first sample.
Additionally, for a 26-project subset of the 38 projects above, it is
possible to tabulate specific estimates of the monetary benefits and
costs to consumers of CPSC actions (again from the MYR and the Product
Profiles ) . These 26 projects constitute the second sample.
Details of data used for this study, including comments on its
shortcomings are included in Section Three of this essay. In the next
section, the statistical procedure used to analyze this data is out-
lined.
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II. Basic Aspects of Random Orderings
While the announced ranking of projects is expectedly related to
the various observable project attributes, it is unlikely that this
relation will be exact, or deterministic. The priorities of the CPSC
thus represent a random ordering based on observable project attributes
This ordering is devoid of any implications of cardinality, being based
simply on comparisons of ordinal or relative importance of projects.
In other words, the ranking numbers (as well as the high or medium
categories) in Table Two have no statistical significance in and of
themselves, serving merely to indicate the relationships of relative
importance among the various projects. Statistical technique appro-
priate to ordinal dependent variables then must be used for analysis
of CPSC priorities. At this point, a minor problem emerges—available
ordinal techniques are limited to probabilistic selections of single
projects out of project sets, and do not currently provide for proba-
bilistic rankings or orderings. And while the relationships between
selections and rankings are quite straightforward in the deterministic
case, the introduction of stochastic elements makes these relationships
more complex. Nonetheless, there are several basic principles con-
necting random choices and orderings, as outlined below.
The CPSC will be regarded as selecting projects for execution on
the basis of a usefulness index (or utility function) which is a linear
combination of functions of observable project attributes:
(1) U(x.) = b X. + e. for all j in A
3 3 2
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where x . = vector of functions of observable attributes
J
b = vector of policy weights for elements of x.
e
.
= scalar contribution of unobservable attributes
J
A = set of (n) projects
The CPSC is thus regarded as choosing for execution the projects in A
with the largest usefulness indices (or utility), where these indices
are based on observable attributes. When the unobservable terms (e .)
are randomly distributed over the projects, the choice of a particular
project will not occur with unitary probability. Rather the probabil-
ity that a specific project (j) will be selected, denoted S(j;A), may
be expressed in terms of the usefulness indices as:
(2) PrS(j;A) = Pr(U(x.) > U(x, ) for all k in A)^)
As mentioned above, there is a substantial literature which provides
for estimation of the policy weights (b) based on probabilistic selec-
tion as in (2).
This study, however, concerns probabilistic rankings and not
probabilistic selections. Using the usefulness functions in (1), the
probability of a given project ranking being chosen out of the set of
(n!) possible rankings may be written as:
(3) Pr(r) = Pr(U(w,) > U(w-) > U(w-) > ... > U(w ))
1 z J n
where r = exhaustive ranking of project set A
r . = rank order position of j in A within the particular
ranking r
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w, = vector of functions of observable attributes for the
k
project with rank order k; it should be noted that
9
w = X ..
Almost no empirical work has been performed using random orderings as
in (3), so that at first examination, no simple estimation programs exist
for analysis of these orderings. Fortunately, however, in the special
case when the error terms in (1) have independent, identical extreme
value distributions, then the probability for a given exhaustive ranking
as in (3) may be expressed as a product of selection probabilities from
(2). Thus existing technique for analysis of selection probabilities
may be used after all. More specifically, the extreme value distribu-
tion is:
(A) Pr(e . < v) = exp(-exp(-v))
When the error terms in (1) are independently, identically distributed
as in (4), the selection probabilities in (3) may be written as:
exp(b X.)
(5) PrS(j;A) = ^
tj^I^expCb x^)
Further, using (4) the probability of the ranking in (3) may be
1''
expressed in terms of these selection probabilities as:
(6) Pr(r) = PrS(rj_;r^,r2,r3,...r^) * PrS(r2; r^ ,r3
,
. . .r^)
*?TS(r^;v^,T^,...r^)
*
... *PrS(r ;r ,r )
n- 1 n- i n
-12-
It should be recognized that (6) is in general not correct and in fact
occurs only under the circumstances that (4) holds.
If the CPSC priorities described in Section I were indeed an
exhaustive ranking of projects considered, then (6) would represent
the likelihood function for this study, and maximization of (6) would
yield the desired estimates of policy weights. In actuality, as dis-
cussed earlier, the priority decision process used by the CPSC was
slightly more complex. First, projects were segregated into three
categories (high, medium, and low); secondly, those projects in the
high and medium categories were exhaustively ranked. The first step
may be regarded as generation of a categorical ranking , the proba-
bility of which may be expressed as:
(7) Pr(r;c^,C2,C3) = Pr(U(w^^^) ,U(w^^2) » • • -^Cwj^/^ )
> U(W2/^),U(W2^^),...U(W2/^ )
where c . = number of projects in category j
w.,, = project number (k) in category (j)
Thus the likelihood function for the CPSC priorities actually should
consist of the product of the probability of the categorical ranking
of all projects (with three categories) and of the probabilities of
two exhaustive rankings with only those projects in each of the first
two categories. Unfortunately, the probability in (7) does not decom-
pose into products of selection probabilities, and this second approach
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thus requires nonlinear estimation based on a very complex likelihood
function.
A more promising strategy is to treat the CPSC priorities as a
partial ranking , or a ranking of only the first (p) out of (n) projects
in A. A partial ranking may also be defined as a categorical ranking
where the first (p) categories contain but one project each. Based on
the usefulness indices in (1) , the probability of a partial ranking is
clearly:
(8) Pr(r;p,n) = Pr(U(w^) > UCw^) > UCw^) >
.. > U(w ) > max(U(w_^T) ... U(w )))
p p+l n
In fashion similar to an exhaustive ranking and dissimilar to a cate-
gorical ranking, a partial ranking may be expressed in terms of selec-
tion probabilities when the error term for the usefulness indices are
independently, identically distributed as in (4):
(9) Pr(r;p,n) = PrSCr^^; r^.r^ , . . .r^) * PrS(r2; r2 .r^ , . . .r^)
*
... *PrS(r ;r ,r .^,...t )
p p p-rl n
By regarding the announced CPSC priorities as a partial ranking of
a fixed project set, the likelihood function for this study is thus the
product of selection probabilities as in (9). Using the numerical
expressions for these selection probabilities in (5), the log-likeli-
hood function for these oriorities becomes:
(10)
p exp(b X .)
L(b,x) = log(Pr(r;p,n)) = .Z, log p ^
J"-"- ^ .,t
Z exp( b X
.
)
j=l ^
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Maximization of (10) yields the estimates for policy weights in the
utility function (1) above.
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III. Data
All data for this study are drawn from CPSC documents, notably the
Mid-Year Review (MYR) and the earlier Product Profiles . In all cases,
data were chosen from the more recent MYR if at all possible. An out-
line of data for this study, and discussions of their deficiencies
follows, while the most significant variables from the 26-project
sample are listed in Table Three.
A. Announced Criteria
As part of the MYR, and as preparation for the priority-setting
exercise, the CPSC staff prepared ratings for each project for almost
all the criteria continued in the July 1, 1977 Federal Register
announcement. These ratings expectedly established the extent to
which each project embodied the criteria in question, and segregated
each project into high, medium, or low categories based on each cri-
terion. Specific criteria for which ratings were prepared were:
frequency of injury (FI)
severity of injury (SI)
unforeseen nature of risk (UNR)
probability of exposure (PEXP)
vulnerability of population (VP)
risk of chronic hazard (RCH)
benefit-cost ratio (RBC)
For this study, each of these variables was given value (2) if in the
MYR the criterion had been given a "high" rating; variables with
"medium" ratings were given values (1) and "low" ratings value (0).
Several other specifications with these variables were tried, all with
virtually identical results.
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B. Consumer Benefits and Costs
Procedures used here for calculations of benefit-cost data are
identical to those used by the CPSC staff in preparation for the MYR.
Benefits are measured as simply the product of total accident costs
associated with a particular product in 1976 multiplied by the expected
percentage reduction in these costs which would occur when and if the
proposed project becomes fully effective. Estimated deaths are calcu-
lated as 139% of reported deaths, to correct for underreporting (not
all states participated in CPSC data collection efforts). Injury costs
are computed using procedures developed by Technology and Economics,
Inc. under contract from the CPSC. The separate cost components that
together constitute the total injury cost are: health insurance costs,
product liability insurance, litigation costs, foregone earnings, pain
and suffering, retreatment, disfigurement, transportation and visitor's
costs, and hospital (including physician) costs. Offsetting these
benefits of reductions in accident costs are the concommitant in-
creases in regulatory costs, mostly derived from price increases to
consumers and from agency expenditures or resources. Increased costs
to consumers are calculated as simply the product of retail sales for
a particular product in 1976 multiplied by the expected percentage
increase in price due to CPSC action. By inspection, these benefit
and cost estimates will be exact proxies for actual project benefits
and costs only if a) projects are instantly fully effective and b)
product demand is completely inelastic. The data are further limited
in that cost estimates do not account for valuation of reductions in
product utility which safety attachments and related product reformu-
lations so often cause.
-17-
C. Hazard Index
While the MYR contained explicit values for number of injuries
and deaths, as well as calculated mean severity, values for the CPSC
Hazard Index were not available for most projects. Consequently, the
hazard index variable used in this study is the simple product of fre-
quency and mean severity without adjustment to more heavily weight
childrens' accidents (HAZ). Correlation of the computed hazard index
for this study, and the CPSC Index is quite high for those few projects
where comparison can be made, so little bias is introduced through this
tactic.
D. Ethical Variables
Based on staff discussions in the MYR as to the extent to which
specific subgroups of consumers were particularly vulnerable to hazards
reduced by each project, two zero-one variables were created, repre-
senting whether or not either children or the elderly were particularly
susceptible to these hazards (VPC and VPE). Additionally, the ratio
of consumer death costs to total accident costs (injury plus death
costs) was computed for each project (DCR)
.
E. Regulatory Strategy
In order to determine the expected consumer benefit and costs for
each project, the CPSC staff necessarily determined the "most likely"
strategy for regulation of those hazards considered. Strategy
options were: mandatory standards (requiring by law removal or re-
design of product) , voluntary standards (industry self-design and self-
adoption of safety standards) , information and educational campaigns
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(with no alteration of products), and childproof packaging requirements.
Four zero-one variables were prepared representing whether or not each
project involved each of the above mutually exclusive regulatory stra-
tegies (MS, VS, IE, PACK).
F. Regulatory Effort Variables
Given the most likely regulatory strategy, the CPSC Associate
Executive Directors prepared estimates of the professional person-
months likely to be utilized by each project in FY1977 (E77) and FY1978
(E78) along with the percentage of total professional person-months
necessary for project completion which would have been expended by the
end of FY1978, assuming an "average" pace for project completion
(PC78). Finally, very early estimates of administrative cost alone
were recovered from a 1976 CPSC memoranda (AC). These earlier figures
should be regarded even more cautiously than data collected from the
MYR.
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IV. Empirical Findings
Estimation results are presented in Tables Four through Eight.
Results in the first five of these tables are based on the 26-project
sample for which specific estimates of costs and benefits can be
obtained, whereas results in Table Eight are taken from the 38-project
sample. Several different specifications of utility functions are
offered, with results that are strongly similar across all equations.
Coefficient estimates are for the vector of policy weights in equation
(1), (8), (9), and (10) of Section II. Variance terms for the coef-
ficient estimates are taken from the diagonal of the estimated variance-
covariance matrix based on the log-likelihood function in (10), or:
(11) V = -Exp^'Mb^
3bb^
-1
where this matrix of derivatives is evaluated with actual project
attribute values and with estimated policy weights. The ratio of a
coefficient estimate and the associated standard error are reported
as C/SE Ratio throughout the tables. Reported goodness of fit measures
are the Spearman Rank Correlation coefficient between the announced
13
and predicted rank (SPR), and the standard likelihood ratio (LR).
The estimates offered in Tables Four through Eight represent speci-
fications of agency utility functions. If a value of (ordinal) utility
is fixed, then the estimated equations in these Tables trace out indif-
ference curves for revealed agency preferences. The indifference curves,
and in particular the slopes along these curves (the marginal rates
of substitution) are generally regarded as the most important informa-
tion conveyed by the utility function.
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In a probabilistic sense, the absolute magnitudes of the estimated
policy weights are also interpretable. The estimated probabilities of
selection for individual projects out of project sets may now be com-
puted using (5), and the probabilities of particular partial rankings
may be computed using (9). An interesting interpretation of the abso-
lute magnitude of coefficients in the accompanying Tables is provided
by consideration of the elasticity of the odds for selection of project
PrS( i 'A)
versus another (or ,.^' . ) with respect to any project attribute,
where (x. .) is attribute (i) of project (j). This elasticity is simply
(b.x..).
The specifications in Table Four indicate that the primary deter-
minants of agency rankings are the expected benefits and costs of
various projects, along with the nature of regulatory response—namely
mandatory standard or not. A first conclusion of the study is that
projects which culminate in mandatory standards are given preferential
rankings, while projects which lead to voluntary standards, informa-
tional campaigns, or childproof packaging are ranked much lower. The
significant positive coefficient of the mandatory standards dummy
variable indicates that the usefulness index for projects which lead
to mandatory standards must be relatively large, thus these projects
will be ranked highly. These conclusions carry over when benefit and
cost figures are replaced by the ratio of these values, and also by
the CPSC staff rating (high, medium, low) of the benefit-cost ratio
which was presented in the MYR.
A second conclusion to be drawn from Table Four is that the CPSC
tends to weight safety benefits more heavily than costs imposed on
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consumers. The first specification indicates that benefits are more
heavily weighted by a factor of ten. The implied indifference curves
are drawn in Figure One, with a marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of
costs for benefits of one-tenth (0.1). In the third specification,
benefits and costs nonlinearly enter the utility function. The MRS
for indifference curves generated by the utility function declines con-
tinuously as project "size" increases, as indicated in Figure Two.
Essentially, the MRS is higher for small projects which produce few
benefits or costs, and lower for large projects. It is important to
recognize that the third specification does not impose a diminishing
MRS on the utility function. For if the estimated coefficients on LNB
and LNC were equivalent, then the indifference curves would be a
family of rays from the origin, all with constant MRS. If the coeffi-
cient on LNB were less than that on LNC, then increasing MRS is implied.
As it is, the benefit coefficient is statistically significantly dif-
ferent from the cost coefficient in both the first and third specifica-
tions.
The specifications in Table Two demonstrate that, contrary to
the announced procedures for priorities, most all of the remaining
published criteria were not influential in determining the final
priorities. Numerous specifications using more aggregate versions of
these criteria were tried, with virtually identical results. If any
of the additional criteria are at all significant, it would appear to
be the frequency of accidents, representing a carryover from the Hazard
Index. This variable, however, is not robust to changes in specifica-
tion, and hence conclusions on the importance of this variable are
-22-
suspect. Actually, it would appear that with one exception (discussed
in the next paragraph) no criteria other than those mentioned above
and presented in Table One were at all relevant in determination of
CPSC rankings. However, a qualification should be emphasized here
—
none of the projects in the 26-project sample and only two in the 38-
project sample exhibited any risk of chronic hazard. It is thus quite
likely that the failure of this criteria to be a statistically signi-
ficant determinant of Commission ranking is due more to peculiarities
of data samples used in this study and less to actual Commission
preference.
Specifications in Table Six introduce the Hazard Index, which is a
significant determinant of CPSC decision, and various ethical variables,
which are not. The most statistically robust specification in Table
Four (the third) is used as the basis for analysis. No significant
differences in conclusions are made if other specifications in Table
Four are used instead. The two vulnerability variables thus provide a
second test of the null hypothesis that the announced "vulnerability"
criterion was not used in Commission priority decision. Clearly, this
hypothesis cannot be sensibly rejected.
In Table Seven, various measures of agency resources expended for
project execution are added as possible components of CPSC utility
functions. While all coefficients are of the expected sign, indicating
conservation of resources and preference for rapid completion of pro-
jects, clearly the effects are exceptionally statistically weak. It
is then impossible to reject the hypothesis that the CPSC completely
ignored resources constraints and timeliness in project completion in
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its priority exercises (although in this context several remarks of the
next section are of relevance).
Table Eight presents results for the larger (thirty-eight project)
sample. While neither benefit-cost data nor the hazard index may be
computed for several of the projects in this larger sample, the speci-
fications that can be estimated provide confirmation of results for the
26-project sample.
Finally, the two subsections below provide consideration of correc-
tions to CPSC benefit-cost data, as regards the failure to allow for
discounting and as regards the failure to allow for nonzero elasticities
of product demand. Neither correction influences the arguments of the
text.
Discounting Corrections
The first problem with CPSC benefit-cost data (in the MYR and
generally) is that issues of discounting are completely ignored. These
issues arise due to the peculiar CPSC refusal to distinguish between
product stocks and flows when preparing benefit-cost estimates. The
CPSC computes project costs to consumers on the basis of product flow
(a markup on retail sales), but calculates project benefits on the
basis of product stock (a markdown on total injuries). For projects
that are instantly fully effective, in the sense that the complete
product stock is immediately replaced with newly-complying units, the
CPSC procedure leads to no bias in estimates. For more durable pro-
ducts, however, any regulation induced changes in product design or
manufacture will affect only a fraction of the existing product stock,
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and yield only a portion of the benefits of reduced injuries which
CPSC estimates imply.
More specifically, if the yearly increase in consumer costs is con-
stantly C, the eventual yearly reduction in accident risk costs is con-
stantly B, product life is N in years, and the discount factor is d,
then the correct specification of full costs and benefits for consumers
are:
Costs = C Z d^
t=l
N «
Benefits = I [(-^)d'^] + B E d*^
t=l t=N+l
whereas the CPSC procedure regards project costs as simply (C) and
project benefits as (B). If project costs are to be regarded as
merely (C) , then simplification of the benefit stream using summation
by parts, and division of both consumer costs and benefits by [d(l-d) ]
to establish comparability yields:
Costs = C
Benefits = ^ C^TJ") ^
Principal specifications from Tables Four and Six were reestimated
using the deflated benefits measure derived above. Estimates of pro-
duct life (N) for each project were taken from the MYR and the Product
Profiles . Because the deflation factor for benefits depends nonlinearly
on the discount factor, each specification was estimated five times
using separate discount factors based on interest rates of 0, 1, 5, 10,
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and 50 percent. Two findings emerge. First, the basic arguments of
this study are unchanged. Secondly, the value of the log likelihood
function uniformly declines as discount factors based on higher interest
rates are used. In other words, the maximum likelihood estimate of the
interest rate implicitly used by the Commission in its decision is zero.
This second finding suggests that the CPSC in its project selection is
motivated less by true economic costs and benefits, than by the most
politically salient aspects of potential projects.
Elasticity Corrections
A second correction may be made to CPSC estimates of costs and
benefits to allow for regulation induced variations in product quan-
tity demanded. A useful theoretical framework in which to make these
corrections is outlined below.
The CPSC, in its estimates of consumer costs of regulation, prac-
tically and sensibly assumes that the industries to be regulated are
reasonably competitive with roughly constant returns to scale in manu-
facture, or:
P = MC
MC = AC
where the variables above are respectively, price, marginal cost of
output, and average cost of output. Thus average cost pricing, where
any increase in manufacturing costs due to regulation are fully passed
along to consumers in the form of higher prices is seen as a pragmatic
approximation to actual industry practice.
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Consvmer demand, of course, depends not only on market price (p)
but also on the risk, cost of the product (r). The full price of the
product to the consumer (p*) is then:
p* = p + r
and quantity demanded of a hazardous product is a function of p* (as
18
in Figure Three) . The benefits of CPSC regulation entail reductions
of (r), while the regulatory costs to consumers lead to increases of
(p). When project benefits exactly equal costs (ignoring agency costs),
(p*) will be unchanged, thus quantity demanded will be unchanged. When
benefits exceed costs, (p*) will fall, and quantity demanded of the
product in question will increase (unless demand is completely inelas-
tic). When project costs exceed benefits, the reverse movements in
full price and quantity demanded occur.
The above arguments suggest that when the benefit-cost ratio of a
project exceeds unity, the absolute (though not the relative) magnitudes
of project benefits and costs will be understated. Graphically, current
CPSC procedure, in the case of a decline in full price due to regulation,
would ascribe net benefits of rectangle A in Figure Three to the project
in question. Properly computed however (see the Appendix) net benefits
are the summation of areas A and (triangle) B. Conversely, when the
project benefit-cost ratio is unfortunately less than unity, both
benefits and costs to consumers are overstated by CPSC methods. In
Figure Four, actual net losses to consumers are trapazoid C, while the
CPSC would exaggerate net costs to be the summation of area C and
(triangle) D.
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As a basis for correction of MYR data, the following formulae for
computation of net project benefits should be distinguished
MYR : -Ap*x
proper: -Ap*x - —Ap*Ax
-Ap*Xq[1 - y(%Ap*):
where (n) is the price elasticity of demand. The term in brackets
thus represents a correction factor for net benefits, hence for abso-
lute benefits and costs. Due to the fact that estimates of price
elasticities of demand are not available for the detailed product
categories represented by CPSC projects, an elasticity of unity was
assumed for all products. Specifications in Tables Four and Six were
thereby reestimated using the following revised estimates of project
benefits and costs:
Costs = C[l-^^^:
Benefits = b[1 - -^^^]
where (B) and (C) are MYR estimates, and where (B), (C) , and (%Ap) are
different for each project. Because the basic arguments of the text
are again supported, results of the reestimations are not reported.
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V. Critique
The full process by which the CPSC reached its FY 1977 priorities
reduced a complex decision into a series of three simpler decisions.
First, for each potential project, determination was made for stringency
of regulatory action, or the optimal severity of product redesign or
consumer behavioral change which would be sought in order to improve
safety. Secondly, given stringency, determination was made for the
strategy of regulation, or the specific administrative procedure (man-
datory standard, voluntary standard, informational campaign, etc.)
which would be best employed to obtain the chosen epidemiological
changes. Finally, from among the stringency-strategy pairs for pro-
ducts, priority was determined. While the project rankings which
resulted from this three-step process may well not have been optimal
primarily due to the fact that agency resource constraints would be
ignored in determination of stringency) , a plausible argument can be
made that any potential improvement in social welfare is outweighted
by the administrative costs necessary to simultaneously determine
19
stringency, strategy and priority.
Taking as given this procedural framework, optimal policy is
straightforwardly defined.
Stringency The accident rate should be lowered until the
marginal benefit to consumers in terms of
reduced risk cost equals the marginal cost to
society of regulatory action, or
B
a
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where (a) represents the reduction in the acci-
dent rate and where B >0,B <0,C >0,
a aa — a
C > (see Figures Five and Six),
aa
Strategy Given appropriate stringency of response for a
particular product, net social benefits from each
possible regulatory strategy should be computed:
NSB = B - C - A
or net benefits to consumers minus costs to the
CPSC of mounting and enforcing the strategy in
question (A). The strategy with the largest net
social benefits should be selected.
Priority For each project, the ratio of net benefits for
consumers to CPSC administrative costs should be
computed:
(B - C)/A
Projects should be ranked in terms of these ratios,
and executed in order of that ranking until avail-
able agency resources for the given fiscal years
.
20
are exhausted.
The approach to safety regulation implied by estimated CPSC utility
functions is dramatically different from optimal policy.
Stringency For any given utility function, the CPSC will
reduce the accident level until:
-30-
where the latter term is the marginal rate of sub-
20
stitution between consumer costs and benefits.
As observed earlier, a linear specification of CPSC
preferences suggests an estimate of MRS„^ of one-
tenth. Nonlinear specifications of agency utility
suggest that for MRS will be higher and for large
CB
projects, lower. In sum, these results imply that
the CPSC pursues excessive stringency in its pro-
jects, which may more directly be seen by the fact
that the majority of projects listed in Table Three
exhibit benefit-cost ratios of less than one, hence
ratios of marginal benefits to marginal costs of
certainty less than unity.
Strategy The CPSC will select project strategies which maxi-
mize agency utility, and not net social benefits.
Three aspects of estimated agency preference func-
tion suggest that the CPSC overselects mandatory
standards as safety procedures: a) the direct pre-
ference for mandatory standards, b) the excessive
preference for project benefits over project costs,
which leads to projects so stringent as to be
achievable only by mandatory standards, and c) the
inadequate influence of agency resource constraints.
The priority decision of the CPSC have been discussed at length
earlier and need not be reconsidered at this point. As a general
comment, it is difficult to defend most aspects of the complete CPSC
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regulatory strategy. There is little reason for regarding projects
benefits as more socially significant than project costs. These bene-
fits are reasonably computed, or at least the limited problem with
existing calculations in no way justify heavier weighting of benefits
than costs—most surely not at the levels implied by CPSC regulatory
decisions. The pure preference for mandatory standards is par-
ticularly regretable. The CPSC, in the MYR and elsewhere, explicitly
adjusts estimation of benefits and costs to take account of varying
degrees of compliance with voluntary standards, and varying consumer
responses to information campaigns. CPSC preferences thus effectively
embody the attitude that lives saved and injuries prevented under man-
datory standards are more important for public policy than those
affected by other regulatory strategy. Finally, the failure of the
CPSC to exhibit tendencies to economize on its allegedly scarce re-
sources is hardly conducive to effective safety policy.
At least one aspect of the FY1977 priority decision, however,
should be commended, namely the failure of the five commissioners to
be bound by the announced guidelines. Most of the criteria in these
guidelines have little direct relevance for policy decisions on con-
sumer product safety. Of course, all of the criteria are indirectly
reflected in estimation of either benefits or costs. For example,
products with frequent, severe injuries do provide suitable targets for
regulation when the injuries in question are amenable to reduction
through regulation. But this reduction in injuries is precisely what
is measured by benefit estimates, and there is at best limited argu-
ment for independent inclusions of accident frequency or severity as
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a determinant of policy, or for inclusion of other indirect criteria.
One often alleged rationale for consideration of indirect factors
(other than the political one of concealing the basis for policy deci-
sion) is that certain criteria are only with difficulty "evaluated in
dollar terms." For example, project aspects which reduce extreme
vulnerability of small children or promote severe industrial concentra-
tion indeed pose complex valuation problems. The flaw in this argument
lies in the fact that any rational decision procedure must face the
problem of tradeoffs between the basic benefit-cost results and addi-
tional criteria, and the actual tradeoffs that are necessarily made by
way of decision reveal an implicit (possibly nonlinear) valuation of
the additional criteria. Whether these tradeoffs are made in terms of
dollars or "social welfare units" or "agency priority indices" can
neither avoid nor obscure the problems of relative valuation, and the
difficulties they cause for safety regulation.
Appendix
For a constant cost industry facing a consumer demand function
which exhibits zero income elasticity of demand, social surplus is
the difference between total value of the product and the sum of manu-
facturing and consumer risk costs:
SS = V(x) - [C(x) + R(x)]
V = /J P*(y)dy
C = ax a is average manufacturing cost
R = rx r is per unit risk, cost
Then the change in social surplus generated by CPSC regulation is;
ASS = AV - AC - AR
1
=
/^^ P*(y)dy - (a^x^ - apXp)
-
^Vi - '^O^O^
Note that p* = a + r when the industry behaves perfectly competitively.
Therefore:
1
^SS = /^ p*(y)dy - P^ x^ + Pq x^.
=
J * X (2)d2
where x = x (p*), which monotonically decreases with p*.
Table 1
CPSC Hazard Index, FY1976
Rank Product
''"
AFSI
^
1 Bicycles 35.7
2 Stairs
_
25.4
3 Football 13.8
4 Baseball 12.0
5 Playground Equipment 11.0
6 Tables (non-glass) 10.2
7 Swimming Pools 9.2
8 Beds 8.7
9 Fuels 8.4
10 Nails, etc. 7.6
11 Basketball 7.1
12 Chairs and Sofas 6.9
13 Household Cleaners 6.2
14 Architectural Glass 6.1
15 Floors 5.8
16 Ranges and Ovens 5.7
17 Lawnmowers 5.0
18 Skates and Skateboards 4.9
19 Furnaces 4.7
20 Bathtubs and Showers 4.5
Abbreviated product description.
2
Age adjusted frequency-severity index.
Table Two
CPSC Project Priorities; FY1977-1978
Rank Project (Most Likely Strategy)
High Priority Projects
1 Asbestos (MS)
2 Power Mowers (MS)
3 Gas Space Heaters (Ban)
4 -= Communication Antennae (MS)
5 Public Playground Equipment (MS)
6 Chlorofluorocarbons (IE)
7 Architectural Glass (MS)
8 Refuse Bins (Ban)
9 Lead-in-Paint (Ban)
10 Pacifiers (MS)
11 Toys—Generic Sharp Points (MS)
12 Methyl Alcohol (IE)
13 Upholstered Furniture (MS)
14 Toys—Generic Sharp Edges (MS)
15 Childrens' Sleepwear (Enforcement)
16 Miniature Christmas Tree Lights (MS)
17 Television Receivers (MS)
18 Aluminum Wire (MS)
19 Ranges and Ovens (VS)
20 Skateboards (MS)
21 Extension Cords and Trouble Lights (MS)
22 Bicycles (MS)
23 Bookmatches (MS)
24 Ladders (VS)
25 Energy Conservation Devices (Research)
26 Bathtubs and Showers (VS)
27 Smoke Detectors (Research)
28 Childrens' Football Helmets (MS)
29 Toys—Generic Small Parts (MS)
Medium Priority Projects
1 Portable Power Saws (VS)
2 Chain Saws (VS)
3 OTC Antihistamines (Pack)
4 Power Drills (VS)
5 Petroleum Distallates (Pack)
6 Drain Cleaners (Ban)
7 Nonportable Power Saws (VS)
8 Eye Irritants (Research)
9 Wearing Apparel (MS)
10 Rust Removers (Ban)
11 Ammonia (IE)
12 Skin Irritants (Research)
13 Window Bars (VS)
14 Skiing Equipment (VS)
15 FHSA Flammability (Enforcement)
16 FFA Guarantees (Enforcement)
17 PPPA Exemptions (Enforcement)
Table Three
CPSC Project Priorities, FY1977-1978
Rank Project Strategy Benefits Costs
Hazard
Index
High Priority Projects
2 Power Lawnmowers
3 Gas Spare Heaters
5 Public Playground Equipment
7 Architectural Glass
13 Upholstered Furniture
17 Television Sets ^_
19 Ranges and Ovens
21 Extension Cords and Trouble Lights
23 Bookmatches
24 Ladders
26 Bathtubs and Showers
MS 112.5 285.0 5.62
MS 5.8 3.0 .34
MS 10.5 5.2 4.88
MS 48.4 53.0 1.38
MS 412.3 855.0 1.77
MS 10.6 122.5 .60
VS 27.2 31.2 3.21
MS .8 7.6 .33
MS 14.6 39.5 1.67
VS 17.6 18.8 2.97
VS 67.4 25.0 2.72
Medium Priority Projects
1 Power Saws (Portable)
2 Chain Saws
3 QIC Antihistamines
5 Petroleum Disfollates
6 Drain Cleaners
7 Power Saws (Non-Portable)
9 Wearing Apparel
10 Rust Removers
11 Ammonia
VS 2.4 5.0 3.25
VS 6.8 10.2 .38
Pack 4.8 1.9 .60
Pack 1.5 5.9 .22
MS 1.1 1.0 .51
VS .5 3.2 3.25
MS 102.6 5000.0 1.45
MS .2 .5 .02
Pack 2.0 18.0 .14
Low Priority Project
*
*
Aerosol Containers
Electric Edge Trimmers
Gasoline Containers
Soft Drink Containers
Tents
VS .8 70.5 .62
VS 3.5 9.0 .23
VS 3.3 60.0 3.77
VS 3.8 65.0 .52
MS .1 .5 .05
Table Four
Alternate Specifications of CPSC Preference Functions
Specification
1
Variable Coefficient C/SE Ratio
B .47 X 10-2 1.86
C -.34 X 10-3 -1.47
MS 1.31 2.65
LR = 10.3 SPR = .840
BCR .87 3.10
MS 1.61 3.14
LR = 14.4 SPR = .745
LNB 1.13 4.13
LNC -.83 -3.70
MS 2.12 3.50
LR = 28.1 SPR = .849
LNBCR .76 3.32
MS 1.76 3.37
LR = 20.5 SPR = .801
RBC 1.27 3.67
MS 2.16 3.56
LR = 20.9 SPR = .785
B - Project Benefits to Consumers
C - Project Costs to Consumers
BCR - Ratio of B to C
LN* - Natural Logarithm of Variable *
Table Five
Alternate Specifications of CPSC Preference Functions
Specification Variable Coejfficient C/SE Ratio
1 LNB 1.10 3.85
LNC -.85 -3.72
MS 2.22 3.29
FI .17 .34
LR = 28. 2 SPR = .875
2 LNB I.IA 4.14
LNC -.84 -3.72
MS 1.99 2.95
SI .16 .40
LR = 28. 3 SPR = .840
3 LNB 1.12 4.01
LNC -.86 -3.63
MS 2.34 3.16
UNFOR -.28 -.57
LR = 28. 5 SPR = .874
U LNB 1.08 3.64
LNC -.84 -3.75
MS 2.06 3.30
PEXP .17 .34
LR = 28. 2 SPR = .865
5 LNB 1.06 3.93
LNC -.81 -3.72
MS 2.38 3.46
VP .33 .97
LR = 29. 1 SPR = .874
Table Six
Alternate Specifications of CPSC Preference Functions
Specification Variable Coefficient C/SE Ratio
1 LNB 1.05 3.87
LNC -.83 -3.76
MS 2.25 3.71
HAZ .34 1.73
LR = 31. SPR = .859
2 LNB 1.00 3.46
LNC -.79 -3.38
MS 2.31 3.74
HAZ .33 1.64
VPC .30 .51
LR = 31. 2 SPR = .851
3 LNB 1.24 3.95
LNC -.85 -3.64
MS 2.39 3.82
HAZ .34 1.74
VPE -1.17 -1.41
LR = 33. 1 SPR = .846
4 LNB 1.03 3.66
LNC -.80 -3.32
MS 2.29 3.69
HAZ .36 1.75
DCR -.43 -.37
LR = 31. 1 SPR = .832
Table Seven
Alternate Specifications of CPSC Preference Functions
Specification Variable Coefficient C/SE Ratio
1 LNB 1.06 3.85
LNC -.82 -3.33
MS 2.30 2.93
HAZ .35 1.72
E77 -.005
LR = 31.0
-.10
2 LNB 1.04 3.80
LNC -.83 -3.69
MS 2.36 3.43
HAZ .33 1.68
PC78 .50 .33
LR = 31.1
LNB
LNC
MS
HAZ
AC
1.09 3.46
-.86 -3.33
2.31 3.44
.38 1.50
-.45 -.21
LR = 31.
Table Eight
Alternate Specifications of CPSC Utility Functions
Specification Variable Coefficient C/SE Ratio
RBC .96 3.32
MS 2.29 4.20
LR = 23.0 SPR = .697
RBC .93 3.05
MS 2.07 3.35
FI -.18 -.32
LR = 23.6 SPR = .645
RBC 1.14 3.53
MS 2.43 3.57
SI -1.04 -1.59
LR = 30.1 SPR = .701
RBC .95 3.27
MS 2.20 3.61
E77 .007 .33
LR = 23.1 SPR = .682
RBC .86 2.84
MS 2.46 4.21
PC78 1.24 1.19
LR = 24.5 SPR = .721
Table Nine
Actual
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
23
23
23
23
23
Project
Power Lawnmowers
Gas Space Heaters
Public Playground Equipment
Architectural Glass
Upholstered Furniture
Television Sets
Ranges and Ovens
Extension Cords and Trouble Lights
Bookmatches
Ladders
Bathtubs and Showers
Power Saws (Portable)
Chain Saws
OTC Antihistamines
Petroleum Distallates
Drain Cleaners
Power Saws (Non-Portable)
Wearing Apparel
Rust Removers
Ammonia
Tents
Aerosol Containers
Gasoline Containers
Soft Drink Containers
Electric Edge Trimmers
Predicted
Rank
2
5
1
4
3
12
8
11
7
9
6
13
17
10
21
16
19
14
22
23
15
25
20
24
18
Predicted rank for each project based on equation (1)
of text and specification one of Table Six.
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class) associated with the product in question, where the accident
numbers are estimated and extrapolated from reports to hospital emer-
gency rooms. Severity weights are drawn from an (easily questionable)
numerical scale ranging from low weights for minor injuries to expo-
nentially larger weights for consumer deaths. Adjustments are made to
weight more heavily accidents occurring to children under 14 years of
age. The resulting index numbers are understandably and technically
known as the Age Adjusted Frequency-Severity Index.
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more complex functional forms. The utility function Uj is technically
the indirect utility function as agency resource constraints should be
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The original project numbering provides a sequence of projects
denoted xj; the agency ranking provides a renumbering of projects into
a new sequence, denoted wj^.
For the derivation of this result, see the reference in foot-
note 6.
This result was first demonstrated by Daniel McFadden, "Condi-
tional Logit Analysis of Quantitative Choice Behavior," in Paul
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This equation was first derived, in a quite different context,
by H. D. Block and Jacob Marschak, "Random Orderings and Stochastic
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and Statistics , Stanford University Press, 1960.
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The value of the likelihood function when evaluated at the zero
vector is -53.22.
14
Values of the relevant statistic with 1 and (315 - p) degrees of
freedom where (p) is the number of coefficients estimated are for spe-
cifications one of Table Four, three of Table Four, and one of Table
Six respectively, 3.13, 7.67, and 4.05.
The correlations between the various rating variables and either
LNB, LNC, or MS are all uniformly low.
Significance of the Hazard Index alongside insignificance of the
FI and Si variables appears to occur because the Index isolates a
handful of projects with very high Index values, while both the staff
prepared rating variables exhibit far less variance among projects.
The division by d(l-d) is acceptable procedure as a) the
benefit-cost ratio is unchanged, and b) the division applies uniformly
to costs and benefits of all projects, hence will not affect utility
rankings given the linear and logarithmic specification of utility
functions used in this essay.
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To the extent that consumers fail to perceive product risk prior
to purchase, changes in market price rather than full price determine
quantity demanded.
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These arguments parallel those of Peter Steiner on more general
budgeting issues, in Alan Blinder and Robert Solow, The Economics of
Public Finance (Brooking, 1974).
In a strict technical sense, the priority decision is an appli-
cation of integer programming known as the "knapsack problem." The
argument of the text is an approximation to the solution of the knap-
sack problem due to the implicit assumption that agency resource con-
straints are not completely strict. The notion is that should the
last project selected not be fully fundable in the given fiscal year,
it may be completed in the next year.
21
The equation in the text represents a necessary condition for
maximization of U(B(a), C(a)), where MRScB ==
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